FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1620220-001

Total Deleted Page(s) = 5
Page 1 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 2 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 3 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 20 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 21 ~ Referral/Consult;

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X For this Page X
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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Felt
Rosen
Mohr
Bishop
Miller, E.S.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Cleveland
Ponder
Bates
Waikart
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

b6
b7C

1 - [redacted]
1 -

TO: [redacted]

DATE: 1/5/72

1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: SALT LEK
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

Memorandum recommends that WFO be granted authority to interview William Manuel Beecher, Washington, D. C.,-based correspondent of "The New York Times" who authored 7/23/71 article appearing in that newspaper which contained classified information regarding Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

The Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, requested a complete investigation by letter dated 7/30/71. We have interviewed all logical individuals having access to information appearing in Beecher's article who are employed at the National Security Council, Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (USDS), and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with exception of those on a Cabinet level. The next logical step in order to conclude the investigation is interview of Beecher, and it is considered that this should be done.

We have been informed in the strictest confidence that the investigation has resulted in administrative action being instituted against Dr. William R. Van Cleave by DOD and [redacted] by USDS, both at the instruction of The White House. We have likewise been informed that security measures at the various agencies have been tightened and that Beecher has made comments that this investigation has hurt him and his sources have "dried up." [redacted]

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EX-101 REC-58

Of interest are comments by Beecher indicating some disappointment and surprise that he has not been interviewed in view of the scope and intensity of the investigation. He is 38 years of age, [redacted] and resides in [redacted] Beecher holds a B.A. degree from Harvard with an M.S. degree in journalism from Columbia. He has been employed in Washington, D. C., since 1959, having worked for Fairchild Publications, Incorporated, and the "Wall Street Journal" prior to commencing employment with "The New York Times" in 1965.

10 JAN 13 1972

Enclosure sent 1-6-72
[redacted]

SPEC. INV. OFFICE

HJM:bsf (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

265
67 JAN 14 1972

[redacted]

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
FBI
JAN 6 9 39 AM 1972

REC'D - [redacted] FBI
JAN 6 12 40 PM '72

REC'D [redacted] FBI-JUSTICE

JAN 6 7 05 AM '72

JAN 6 4 42 PM '72
DOM. INTELLIGENCE DIV.

JAN 6 11 37 AM '72
RECEIVED-TOLSON
F B I

JAN 6 10 08 AM 1972
RECEIVED
LEGAL COUNSEL

REC'D [redacted] FBI-JUSTICE
JAN 6 4 50 PM '72

b6
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b3
b7E

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Back of Page

Memorandum to [redacted]
RE: SALT LEK
[redacted]

b3
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b7C
b7E

Although it cannot be expected that Beecher will identify his source or sources of information, it is entirely possible he will furnish his reasoning for publishing this story since it has been determined he has in the past killed stories which he felt were damaging to the U. S. and he has additionally stated that "The New York Times" should not have published the "Pentagon papers." Beecher should be interviewed and given the opportunity to furnish any information which may be of value in determining whether additional investigation should be conducted. It is noted by letter 8/16/71 concerning "Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information" the Attorney General stated there were no restrictions on the Bureau in conducting interviews with press representatives, except for Neil and [redacted] Sheehan, potential defendants in the case involving the "Pentagon papers."

ACTION:

If approved, the attached airtel will be sent WFO directing that Beecher be interviewed away from the premises of "The New York Times" by two mature, experienced Agents completely familiar with this investigation. He will be informed at the outset that the investigation has been requested by the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division.

187

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

[redacted]

8/25/71

[redacted]

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

[redacted]

LEAKS OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION TO THE PRESS

To summarize, for information, data received during the night from offices involved in our continuing investigations of alleged leaks of classified data to the press.

MC LEK (Daniel Ellsberg): On 8/10/71, [redacted] b6 b7C
as acquaintance of [redacted] advised us that he had stayed at the [redacted] Massachusetts, [redacted] and while he was [redacted] at the time he arrived in [redacted] he said he had not seen either since that meeting. During this interview, [redacted] advised [redacted] furnished us descriptive information concerning [redacted]

[redacted] was subsequently subpoenaed to appear before a Federal Grand Jury [redacted] Prior to his appearance, [redacted]

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

No information has been developed during this investigation to indicate [redacted]

[redacted]

62-93194

1 - [redacted] (MC LEK)
1 - [redacted] (SALT LEK)

SEP 8 1971

54 SEP 8 1971

(12)

JUN 2 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum, [redacted] b6
Re: LEAKS OF CLASSIFIED b7C
INFORMATION TO THE PRESS
62-98194

Investigation at Boston and New York indicates that [redacted] revealed in this investigation [redacted] We are endeavoring to verify this information in order to locate [redacted] for interview.

SALT LEK (Leak of Classified Information Concerning Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Appearing in "The New York Times" Article by William Beecher, 7/23/71): [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7D b7E stated yesterday [redacted] but both denied being acquainted with William Beecher. [redacted] said it was his personal opinion information utilized by Beecher in his article of 7/23/71 emanated from [redacted]

[redacted]

ACTION:

For information.

Investigations of leaks of classified information to the press continue to receive intensive investigative attention, and you will be advised of pertinent developments.

Pertinent portions of data herein will be included in a weekly memorandum to the White House and will be furnished to the Attorney General as well as the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division.

8/25/71

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

NR 003 WF CODE

1240PM URGENT 1-12-72 [redacted]KA

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 12 1972

TELETYPE

TO DIRECTOR [redacted]

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

ALEXANDRIA

CHARLOTTE [redacted]

NEW YORK

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD [redacted]

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, ES
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Walkart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

SALK LEK, [redacted] (SIO), 00 WFO

RE WFO AIRTEL DECEMBER TWELVE LAST AND BUREAU AIRTEL JANUARY SIX LAST.

WILLIAM BEECHER, CONTACTED TELEPHONICALLY THIS DATE IN EFFORT TO ARRANGE INTERVIEW OF HIM CONCERNING CAPTIONED MATTER. HE STATED HE WOULD HAVE TO SEPAK TO [redacted] [redacted] WASHINGTON, D.C. BUREAU, QUOTE THE NEW YORK TIMES UNQUOTE BEFORE GIVING A RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST. BEECHER TELEPHONICALLY RECONTACTED WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE APPROXIMATELY THIRTY MINUTES LATER TO ADVISE HE RESPECTFULLY DECLINED TO BE INTERVIEWED. HE EXPLAINED IT WAS HIS FEELING, AND THAT OF [redacted], THAT SINCE THE INTERVIEW WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE TO DO WITH HIS SOURCES OF [redacted] NEWS INFORMATION, WHICH HE WAS UNWILLING TO DISCUSS, THEY FELT NO USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY MEETING WITH BUREAU REPRESENTATIVES.

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REC-59 61-103

16 JAN 13 1972

ADMINISTRATIVE

WILLIAM BEECHER CONTACTED BY SA [redacted] [redacted]

JAN 13 1972

END PAGE ONE

IN LIGHT OF BEECHERS REFUSAL TO BE INTERVIEWED, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT FURTHER INVESTIGATION IS WARRANTED BY CHARLOTTE TO DETERMINE HIS VACATION LOCALE IN JULY, OR AT ALEXANDRIA REGARDING [redacted] b6 b7C UACB, ALEXANDRIA AND CHARLOTTE WILL DISCONTINUE AND SUBMIT RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION TO DATE FOR COMPLETION OF BUREAU AND WFO FILES.

AS SET OUT IN REFERENCED WFO AIRTEL, THIS INVESTIGATION HAS HAD CERTAIN APPARENTLY SALUBRIOUS EFFECTS RELATIVE TO HANDLING OF CLASSIFIED SALT INFORMATION, AND LOGICAL LEADS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED IN AN EFFORT TO IDENTIFY BEECHERS SOURCE. ACCORDINGLY, WFO WILL SUBMIT CLOSING REPORT CONTAINING ABOVE DESCRIBED EFFORT TO INTERVIEW BEECCHER.

END

GXC FBI WASHDC

188

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
WASHINGTON FIELD	WASHINGTON FIELD	1/14/72	12/29/71 - 1/14/72

TITLE OF CASE: SALT LEK

Photo
CC TO: VSSS/ISD
REQ. REC'D 4-21-85
APR 15 1985
AN
BY [redacted]
Re: William Beecher

REPORT MADE BY [redacted]

TYPED BY: ksv

CHARACTER OF CASE [redacted]

b3 b6 b7C b7E

GS

REFERENCE: Report of [redacted] dated 12/30/71.

- P -

7

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Information copies of instant report designated for Alexandria and New York per instructions in Bureau airtel dated 8/5/71.

b3 b6 b7C b7E

As set out in WFO teletype dated 1/12/72, it does not appear that further investigation at Alexandria and Charlotte is warranted regarding [redacted] and BEECHER's July vacation locale, respectively, in light of the refusal by BEECHER to be interviewed by Bureau agents.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE						ACQUITTALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		
							PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED [redacted] SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

[redacted]

REC-11

EX-103

5 - Atty

COPIES MADE:
(3) Bureau [redacted]
1- Alexandria (Info)
1- New York (Info)
3- WFO [redacted]

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	Lead to RAO-ISD for info, tickler retained			6107
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.	1-17-72			
How Fwd.	CM			
By	[redacted]			

Notations: 2 JAN 19 1972

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR DISSEMINATION

GPO : 1971—446-529

58 JAN 21 1972

COVER PAGE

cc to ADIC
RR 11/29/93
Feed 12/2/93
ANS BY
K. William Mehaffie



b6
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b3
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b7E

Back of Page

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

representatives. Alexandria and Charlotte were instructed in above mentioned teletype to discontinue investigation and submit results of investigation already conducted for completion of Bureau and WFO files.

LEAD

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D. C. Upon receipt of results of leads outstanding in this matter at Alexandria and Charlotte, will review same for information indicating the basis for additional investigation. If none indicated, this case will be closed at that time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: [redacted] Office: Washington, D. C.

Date: 1/14/72

Field Office File #: [redacted] Bureau File #: [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Title: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Unauthorized disclosure of information pertaining to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) appearing in "New York Times" article, Friday, July 23, 1971 by WILLIAM BEECHER.

~~Character~~

Character: [redacted]
~~SECURITY~~

Synopsis: WILLIAM BEECHER, 7911 Robison Road, Bethesda, Maryland, contacted 1/12/72, respectfully declined to be interviewed by representatives of the FBI, stating he was unwilling to discuss his sources of news information.

- P -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

189

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 351-076

FD-302 (REV. 11-3)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 1/13/71

WILLIAM M. BEECHER, 7911 Robinson Road, Bethesda, Maryland, was telephonically contacted at his residence. He was requested to meet with SA [redacted] concerning his article in "The New York Times" on July 23, 1971, concerning the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. b6 b7C

BEECHER stated that he was well aware that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been conducting an investigation concerning his article. He stated he would have to confer with [redacted] Washington, D.C. Bureau, "The New York Times", before responding to the request for interview.

BEECHER telephonically recontacted SA [redacted] within thirty minutes to advise that he respectfully declined to be interviewed. He stated he felt, [redacted] concurred, that no useful purpose would be served by interview of him, since it would necessarily have to do with his sources of news information, an area he is unwilling to discuss.

Interviewed on 1/12/72 at Washington, D.C. File # [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

by SA [redacted] sjd Date dictated 1/12/72

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] NSC

b6
b7C

1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
1 -

January 16, 1972

BY LIAISON

1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -

Honorable W. W. Rostow
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rostow:

Enclosed is a memorandum covering this Bureau's investigation during the past week relating to Daniel Ellsberg and the publication of material concerning the United States-Vietnam relations during the period 1945-1967.

The memorandum also covers this Bureau's investigation during the past week relating to the unauthorized disclosure involving the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

We are continuing these investigations, and you will be furnished further results obtained.

Single copies of the enclosures are also being sent to the Honorable Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, and to the Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

Enclosures

62-69184

1 - [redacted] (DOC LIAS)
1 - [redacted] (SALT LIAS)

JRW:bjs
(11)

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

61 JAN 21 1972

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-14-2015 BY [redacted] NSC

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

January 19, 1972

BY LIAISON

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

Honorable Egil Krogh, Jr.
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Domestic Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Krogh:

Enclosed is a summary covering this Bureau's investigation during the past week relating to Daniel Ellsberg and the publication of material concerning the United States-Vietnam relations during the period 1945-1967.

The summary also covers this Bureau's investigation during the past week relating to the unauthorized disclosure involving the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

We are continuing these investigations, and you will be furnished further results obtained.

Single copies of the enclosures are also being sent to the Honorable H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President, and to the Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

Enclosures

62-88164

1 - [redacted] (SLC LEX)
(1) - [redacted] (SALT LEX)

b3
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b7C
b7E

1/19/72

6 JAN 21 1972

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADG

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] DATE: 1/18/72

FROM : SAC, ALEXANDRIA [redacted] (RUC)

SUBJECT: SALT LEK
[redacted] (SIO)
(OO: WFO)

Re WFO airtel dated 12/30/71, WFO report of SA [redacted] dated 12/30/71 and WFO teletype dated 1/12/72.

In accordance with referenced WFO teletype investigation in this matter is being discontinued and the following concerning [redacted], a BEECHER associate, is submitted for completion of WFO and Bureau files:

Records of Credit Bureau, Inc., WDC, checked on 1/5/72, revealed a credit report dated 7/27/71, listing [redacted] birth date was listed as [redacted] place not indicated, and [redacted] birth date was listed as [redacted] place not indicated.

Telephonic inquiry of the [redacted] company. The AAA Decorating Company was observed to be a rather small office in a large shopping center with a stock consisting for the most part of paint and supplies, includin[redacted] artist's supplies.

ST-102 REC-6 [redacted]

(2)-Bureau [redacted] (By Courier)
2-WFO [redacted] (By Courier)
1-Alexandria [redacted]
RET:sfc
(5)

20 JAN 19 1972

SPEC. INV. OFFICE

JAN 27 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

FBI

Date: 1/15/72

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

b3
b7E

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]
ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM: SAC, CHARLOTTE [redacted] (RUC)

SUBJECT: SALT LEK
[redacted] (SIO)

(OO: WFO)

Re WFO teletype to Bureau, 1/12/72.

The Bureau and WFO are in possession of all investigation conducted by the Charlotte Office in Dare County, N. C.

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO [redacted] (RM)
1 - Charlotte

b3
b7E

CAM:mpb
(5)

EX-104
REC-6 [redacted]

2 JAN 19 1972

5-87

SPEC. INV. OFFICE

Approved: 57 JAN 27 1972 Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971—413-135

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

Tolson
Felt
Rosen
Bishop
Miller, A.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Cleveland
Ponder
Bates
Waikart
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

TO : [redacted]

DATE: 1/13/72

FROM : [redacted]

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

SUBJECT: SALT LEK
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (SIO)

1 - [redacted]

Pursuant to prior authority (obtained by memorandum 1/5/72), the Washington Field Office on 1/12/72 contacted William Beecher, Washington, D. C., correspondent of "The New York Times," for purpose of arranging an interview concerning his 7/23/71 article which contained classified information regarding Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Beecher stated that he would have to speak with [redacted] b6 b7C Washington Bureau Chief of "The New York Times," prior to responding to the request for interview. Beecher subsequently contacted the Washington Field Office and advised that he must respectfully decline to be interviewed. He explained it was his feeling, as well as that of [redacted] that since the interview would necessarily concern his sources of news information which Beecher was unwilling to discuss, it was felt no useful purpose would be served by meeting with FBI representatives.

ACTION:

Submitted for information.

Pertinent portions will be included in a weekly summary to The White House, Attorney General and his Deputy, as well as Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division.

A separate letter will be forwarded to the Attorney General pointing out that all logical investigation has been conducted with the possible exception of interviews of persons on the Cabinet level. He will be informed that unless he desires that Cabinet-level individuals be interviewed, the Bureau contemplates no further investigation in this matter.

[redacted] b3 b7E

[redacted]

1 - 62-98194 (Leaks to Press)

HJM:bjp
(8)

REC-4 [redacted]

EX-101

JAN 26 1972

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-98194-

that it was his feeling as well as that of [redacted] that since the interview would necessarily concern his sources of news information, which Beecher was unwilling to discuss, no useful purpose would be served by meeting FBI representatives. b6 b7C

In view of the above, this Bureau plans to conduct no further investigation in this matter.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

NOTE:

Memorandum 1/13/72, [redacted] prepared by HJM:bjp, advised of efforts to interview Beecher, that a letter would be sent the Attorney General showing that all logical investigation has been conducted with the possible exception of interviews of persons on a Cabinet level, and unless the Attorney General desired these interviews, the Bureau contemplated no further investigation in this matter.

19 2

FD-2[illegible] (Rev. 9-17-65)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
Los Angeles	Washington Field	1/14/72	12/10/71 - 1/14/72

TITLE OF CASE: OSALT LAK

REPORT MADE BY: SA [redacted] TYPED BY: fe b6 b7C

CHARACTER OF CASE: SIO

REC-30 1 2

REFERENCE: Los Angeles teletype to Bureau 12/16/71

-RUC-

ADMINISTRATIVE

Extra copies being furnished for possible dissemination.

Photo
CC TO: State 105/OSP/RD
REQ. REC'D 11/13/87
NOV 17 1987
ANS. BY: [redacted]
Re: William Beecher

Photo
CC TO: DSP 4-18-73
REQ. REC'D
APR 20 1973
ANS. BY: PA/[illegible]

Photo
CC TO: USSS/TSD
REQ. REC'D 3-21-85
APR 15 1985
ANS. BY: [redacted]
Re: William Beecher

EX-101 b6 34 b7C

Case has been: Pending over one year ☐ Yes ☒ No; Pending prosecution over six months ☐ Yes ☒ No

APPROVED WKH/[illegible] SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

2D 5- Bureau [redacted] (RM)
2- Washington Field [redacted] (RM)
1- Los Angeles [redacted]

ICC ref 610 DB. JMT

REC- b3 b6 b7C b7E

26 FEB 2 1972

EX-101

CC TO DPM
RR 11/28/73
FEB 22 1973
ANS BY
Re: William Manfred Beecher

SPEC. INV. OFFICE

Dissemination Record of Attached Report — Notations

Agency	Records/ISO
Request Recd.	
Date Fwd.	1-25-72
How Fwd.	1972
By	HJM/[illegible]

(INFO)

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADG

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: SA [redacted] Office: Los Angeles, California
Date: 1/14/72

Field Office File #: LA [redacted] Bureau File #: [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

Title: UNKNOWN SUBJECT;
Unauthorized Disclosure of Information
Pertaining to Strategic Arms Limitations
Talks (SALT) Appearing in "New York Times"
Article, Friday, 7/23/71, by WILLIAM BEECHER

Character: [redacted]

Synopsis:

[redacted] was interviewed concerning an article written by WILLIAM BEECHER as it appeared in the "New York Times" 7/23/71. [redacted] advised he has known BEECHER since approximately 1967 or 1968 but could furnish no information as to the manner in which BEECHER acquired the information which was set forth in the article and stated that he was definitely not the source of this information.

- RUC -

DETAILS:

193

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FD-302 (Rev. 11-27-70)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 12/16/71

[redacted] Los Angeles, California, was questioned relative to an article which was written by William Beecher concerning Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which appeared in an article in the "New York Times" on Friday, July 23, 1971. This article had a dateline of Washington, July 22, 1971. Washington, D.C.

[redacted] stated that he believed he had read the above-referred to article but asked interviewing Agents if they had a copy so that he might refresh his memory. A copy of this article was furnished to [redacted] who after reading the article stated that he believed he had read it in the past or at least had been aware of its existence. England

[redacted] stated he has known William Beecher, the author of the article, since approximately [redacted] on a professional basis. As he recalled, Beecher initially contacted him relative to an article [redacted] had written pertaining to a [redacted] speech that he had delivered in the past. [redacted] believed he gave him a copy of this speech, which was unclassified in nature. At this point he mentioned that at no time has he ever discussed or furnished any reporter any information of a classified nature.

He recalled that he had no personal knowledge relative to Beecher's background or personal life although he did recall that he resided in a suburb of Washington. He related that he has met Beecher approximately [redacted] times, including several lunches, and also at [redacted] which he attended someplace in Washington, D.C. He cannot recall the occasion nor the specific time of this [redacted] He further related that he has talked to Beecher at various times on the telephone.

During his association with Beecher, which has been confined exclusively to that of a professional basis, he has found him to be a very ethical, unbiased individual who always presented articles in a strictly factual manner. He related that Beecher is the only reporter on the "New York Times" to whom he will talk and he added that he makes it a practice to

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Interviewed on 12/15/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles [redacted]

SAs [redacted] WLM

by [redacted] WLM:fet Date dictated 12/16/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2
LA [redacted] b3 b7E

avoid making himself available to reporters whenever possible. He stated that William Beecher has an excellent professional reputation in the defense community.

[redacted] advised that he has no information as to the manner in which Beecher acquired the information which was set forth in the above-referred to article but he emphasized that he definitely was not responsible for furnishing such information. [redacted] stated that from the latter part of [redacted], and was unaware of Beecher's article until approximately [redacted] when he returned to Washington, D.C. He believed at that time, in speaking with colleagues, they either told him of this article or perhaps might have even shown him a copy of it. b6 b7C

[redacted] related that he has no information relative to Beecher's close associates, either businesswise or socially, in or out of the SALT community and he further added that at no time did he direct Beecher to any individuals in the SALT community as possible contacts for Beecher.

After reading the above-referred to article written by William Beecher, he stated that it was his opinion that such information would have been a very closely held secret and that although he has no information regarding the manner of the leak in this matter he would hypothesize that based on his experience in Government matters and on his regard for William Beecher's professional ethics, the following may have taken place:

Beecher was either orally advised or was given access to a written report by a very highly placed Government official. This individual would have such high stature that Beecher would believe that by the very fact that he told him of this information or allowed him to see a report, this would be tantamount to tacit permission to publish same. He stated he feels that had this information been made available to Beecher by a lesser individual, that is, someone on a lower level, that Beecher because of his general reputation and [redacted] regard for him, would certainly have cleared with [redacted] b6 b7C

163

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LA [redacted] b3 b7E

before making such a release. He added that Beecher is not the type of an individual who would have actively sought to obtain such information knowing that he was not authorized to have it and further opined that Beecher is not the type of an individual who would look for a "scoop." It was also his belief that a person who is not on a very high level would not risk the security of his job by making such information available.

[redacted] was questioned concerning his knowledge of the following individuals who are known to have been in contact with Beecher during the period [redacted]

[redacted] stated he has known [redacted] since approximately [redacted] He related that [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] He also related that [redacted] stated that in his opinion [redacted] is a very able and honest individual--and doubted that he would have been in a position to be aware of such information at an early stage and further he considers [redacted] to be an individual that would not leak any confidential or classified information.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] stated that he did not know this individual.

WILLIAM VAN CLEAVE

[redacted] stated that he knew Van Cleave slightly from the [redacted] He is aware that Van Cleave resigned for personal reasons and he did not feel that Van Cleave would disclose information as appeared in Beecher's article.

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[redacted] stated he could not recall this individual.

[redacted] stated he has known [redacted] since [redacted] He stated that [redacted] was formerly on [redacted] He considered [redacted] to be a first class individual of the highest integrity and character. He stated that giving information to [redacted] would be like "putting it in a vault," that he would never under any circumstances divulge any information to anyone to whom this information was not authorized. He said he wished the U.S. Government had five [redacted] working for it and on reflection added he would settle for two [redacted]

[redacted]

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With respect to these [redacted] individuals, [redacted] stated he felt that he did not know them well enough to make any comment.

[redacted]

[redacted] stated that he has known [redacted] since approximately [redacted] He considers [redacted] to be a very able individual. [redacted] stated that in his opinion [redacted] would not have leaked the information that appeared in Beecher's article.

[redacted] added he is still [redacted] however, he has not seen [redacted] since either [redacted] He continued that it is conceivable he may be called upon at some future time to give his services relative to SALT.

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In conclusion, [redacted] stated that he is personally opposed to leaks of classified and sensitive information. He pointed out that when a leak of such information is made on a high level in Government it has a demoralizing effect on those persons in a lesser capacity who have knowledge of certain portions of, or for that matter, the entire information and who have diligently conformed to a code of secrecy, to see such closely guarded material made public.

[redacted] advised if any knowledge of instant matter becomes known to him he will promptly contact the FBI.

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LA [redacted]

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On January 14, 1972, the following agency checks were conducted concerning [redacted], Los Angeles, California, and no derogatory information identifiable with this individual was developed:

Los Angeles Police Department by Special Clerk [redacted] Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office by Special Clerk [redacted]; Credit Bureau of Greater Los Angeles by Investigative Clerk [redacted]

193

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, ES
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

b3
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b7E

FBI

Date: 2/9/72

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

SALT LEK
[redacted]
(OO:WFO)

CDB

Re report of [redacted] at WFO, 1/14/72, b6 b7C
WFO teletype, 1/12/72.

In response to instructions in referenced teletype, Alexandria and Charlotte have discontinued investigation, and have submitted results of investigation conducted by letter dated 1/18/72, and airtel dated 1/15/72, respectively. A review of those investigative results at WFO had disclosed no basis for additional investigation.

In view of above, and in accordance with lead in rereport, this case is being closed.

EX-104

REC-18 [redacted] b3 b7E

1-D
2-Bureau
1-WFO

FEB 10 1972

RGM:11h
(3)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

67 FEB 11 1972

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971—413—135

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b7C
b7E

Back of page

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GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

Memorandum

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Thompson
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Baise
Mr. Barnes
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Mr. Conmy
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Eardley
Mrs. Hogan

TO: [redacted]

DATE: 5/23/73

FROM: [redacted] EM

SUBJECT: SALT TALK LEAK

Salt Talk

According to UPI release this morning, [redacted] has acknowledged that it administered lie detector tests to [redacted] State Department officials in July, 1971, after FBI Director Hoover had refused to let the FBI handle these examinations. According to UPI, an unidentified [redacted] spokesman confirmed that on White House request [redacted] had sent lie detector technicians to the State Department to conduct the tests, which were part of an investigation of a news leak concerning sensitive U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitations talks.

The UPI story further reports that the State Department, in disclosing the lie detector tests on 5/22/73, said that they had been requested by Egil Krogh, Jr., White House assistant, [redacted] A State Department representative, [redacted] was quoted as stating that the matter had been handled by [redacted] under the direction of the State Department's Security Office since "it was apparently the policy of the Director of the FBI not to allow the FBI to polograph employees of other Government agencies." Similar information is contained in an article in this morning's "Washington Post" written by Murrey Marder.

The actual facts regarding FBI involvement in this matter as confirmed in our files are at variance with these news stories. Memorandum from [redacted] 7/26/71 reports that [redacted] and Inspector [redacted] of the Laboratory attended a special meeting at the White House on Saturday afternoon, 7/24/71. Meeting was chaired by Krogh and was attended by a number of top-ranking Government officials, including representatives of Defense Department, General Haig [redacted] assistant), Assistant Attorney General Mardian of the Internal Security Division, [redacted]

Enclosures (2)
1 - [redacted] ENCLOSURE
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
RDC:man
(4)

REC-31 [redacted]

MAY 29 1973

EX-109

CONTINUED - OVER

57 JUN 7 1973

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Memorandum for [redacted] b6 b7C
RE: SALT TALK LEAK

Meeting dealt with recent news story in "New York Times" which included highly sensitive information concerning U.S. position in the Salt Talks and Krogh said that the President wanted effective steps taken to promptly identify the source. During the meeting it was brought out that a prime suspect was Defense Department official William Van Cleave who was being interviewed by Defense Department. Memorandum noted that while the FBI did not desire to sit in on the interview of Van Cleave, the Bureau was prepared to conduct polograph examinations on any logical suspects who might be developed (including Van Cleave if interview of him indicated a criminal violation on his part was involved).

Addendum to [redacted] memorandum 7/26/71 reported b6 b7C that Defense Department interview of Van Cleave had been inconclusive and that the Secretary of Defense had requested a polograph examination of Van Cleave by the FBI; that Van Cleave had agreed to such a test; and that it would be conducted on the afternoon of 7/27/71 by Bureau technicians in the FBI Laboratory.

A subsequent memorandum [redacted] to [redacted] 7/27/71 b3 b6 reported that Mr. Krogh had just telephoned [redacted] and advised that b7C decision had been made to have [redacted] conduct all polograph examinations in b7E this case. Krogh was advised that the FBI had no objection and that the Director's position was simply to render whatever service we could to the White House. Krogh was requested to advise the Bureau immediately if any indication of a Federal violation developed.

ACTION:

This is for the information of [redacted] b6 b7C Attached are copies of the two pertinent memoranda received from [redacted] dated 7/26/71 and 7/27/71, respectively.

RDR EM WGC

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

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GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Felt
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Gale
Ponder
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted]

DATE: 7-27-71

~~FOR INFORMATION~~
~~DO NOT FILE~~

SUBJECT: SALT TALK LEAK

Mr. Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affiars, just called concerning the scheduled polygraph examination for suspect William R. Van Cleave which was to have been conducted at 2:00 p. m. today. b6 b7C

Krogh stated that a decision had been made to have [redacted] b3 b7E [redacted] advised if we had no objection he would instruct the Defense Department to arrange with [redacted] for Van Cleave's examination today.

I told Krogh that the Bureau had no objection and that the Director's position in this matter was simply to render whatever possible service we could to the White House. I told him that we were standing by and would await his further advice in the matter. I also told him we should be advised immediately if any indication of a Federal violation developed.

ACTION:

I have advised [redacted] in the Laboratory of this development b6 and have instructed him that two polygraph operators who were called in from b7C New York can be released to return to New York later this afternoon. We will have three qualified examiners should there be any further developments; however, it is beginning to appear that no further action in this matter by the Bureau will be necessary.

WMF:crt
(2)

Returned to JMC with borrowed Polygraphs 7/27/71

[redacted] b3 b7E

ENCLOSURE

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5010-106

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADG

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Rosen
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Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO [redacted]

FROM [redacted]

DATE: 7-26-71

~~FOR INFORMATION~~
~~DO NOT FILE~~

SUBJECT: SALT TALK LEAK

Pursuant to your instructions, Inspector [redacted] of the Laboratory and I attended a special meeting at the White House at 2:30 p.m., Saturday, 7-24-71. b6 b7C

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs. Also in attendance were David O. Cooke, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration; Leonard Niederlehner Deputy General Counsel, Department of Defense; Brigadier General Alexander Haig, Jr., Assistant to Dr. Kissinger; Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security; and [redacted] to Mr. Krogh.

Krogh called attention to the story in the New York Times on Friday, 7-23-71, written by William Beecher, a New York reporter. The news article discloses highly confidential information regarding proposals being made by U.S. negotiators at Helsinki that would halt construction of both land based missiles and missile submarines. Krogh said that the President "was up on the ceiling" about this leak and wanted effective steps taken to determine the source within 36 hours.

General Haig reported the results of his coordinating and he found that over 200 persons in various agencies, excluding clerical personnel, had access to the Decision Memorandum relating to the U.S. proposals. Mr. Cook reported on the results of investigation in the Defense Department and pointed out that the most logical suspect was William R. Van Cleave, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Plans and Policy, Internal Security Agency. Cook explained that Van Cleave was a party to the development of the proposal. Interview of Van Cleave's secretary disclosed that Van Cleave had unauthorized xerox copies of material relating to the Salt Talks and Decision Memorandum in his safe. The secretary also told Department of Defense investigators that Beecher visited Van Cleave on 7-20-71 at which time they had a lengthy conversation behind closed doors. b3 b7E

WMF:crt
(2)

ENCLOSURE

(OVER...

COPY MADE FOR [redacted] b6 b7C

Memorandum to [redacted]
Re: Salt Talk Leak

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b7C

It was agreed that the contents of Van Cleave's safe should be impounded and inventoried immediately and this order was issued by telephone from the conference. It was also agreed that Van Cleave should be immediately interviewed. The interview was to have been conducted by the Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force (OSI) and by [redacted] Mardian. I rejected a proposal that the FBI sit in on this interview pointing out that at this stage the matter was an internal administrative one and that the FBI should not enter the picture until a criminal violation was indicated.

I assured the group that the FBI was standing by to immediately initiate polygraph examinations of logical suspects. Technical and legal aspects of the polygraph examination were explained to the group.

ACTION:

I have heard nothing further from the White House as of this writing. We are standing by with five qualified operators and five polygraph machines and can initiate examinations within the Laboratory space within a very short time of any request. In view of the strong indications that Van Cleave is the source of the leak in this case, it is not likely that we will be called upon except for possible polygraph examination of Van Cleave.

By separate memorandum I am submitting background data concerning [redacted] and the results of file reviews concerning Van Cleave.

ADDENDUM:

Since dictating the above, [redacted] Chief of the Investigative Division, Department of Defense, called to advise that interview of Van Cleave had not been conclusive and the Secretary of Defense has requested that a polygraph examination be conducted by the FBI. Van Cleave has agreed to this examination which will be conducted at 2:00 p. m. today in the Laboratory. Our polygraph operators are being briefed now by [redacted]

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b7C

O.K.
H.

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5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

1 - Press Services Office
1 - [redacted]

DATE 5/22/73

1 - [redacted]
1 -

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miles
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Thompson
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Hatse
Mr. Barnes
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herrington
Mr. Conny
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Pardiec
Mrs. Hogan

TO [redacted]

FROM

SUBJECT: STATE DEPARTMENT INQUIRY CONCERNING FBI POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS

Mr. Marvin Gentile, Director of Security (and former Special Agent) of the U. S. Department of State, contacted Section Chief Boynton this morning and advised that the Department of State had had several inquiries from "The Washington Post" concerning polygraph examinations given to State Department employees at the time of the "SALT-talk" leak investigation in late 1971. Gentile stated that the Secretary of State, who is presently on a trip to South America, had agreed to release a statement to the press advising that the State Department had permitted polygraph examinations of three of its employees as a result of the leak investigation. Prior to the issuance of the press release, the Secretary requested that the answers to the following two questions be obtained from the FBI: (1) Has the FBI ever used a polygraph on U. S. Government employees?; (2) Has the FBI ever used a polygraph in a "leak-type" investigation? Gentile was queried as to the reason for the Secretary's questions and Gentile advised that he was not aware of the reason for the Secretary's inquiry.

Acting Associate Director W. Mark Felt advised that we should answer Question No. 1 by stating that, while we do on a selective basis occasionally use polygraph examinations involving FBI employees, we would not reply as to FBI use of polygraph examinations on non-Bureau Government employees. In addition, the Bureau maintains no records on its use of polygraph examinations and, therefore, it would be impossible to determine if a polygraph examination was ever used in a "leak-type" case or investigation.

The aforementioned information was furnished to Mr. Gentile, who advised that he would furnish this information to the Secretary of State.

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ST 107 REC-64 [redacted]

Mr. Gentile called back a short time later to advise that the Secretary of State was at that moment calling from Rio de Janeiro and desired to know if the FBI had a policy involving the use of polygraph examinations. Mr. Gentile was informed that, insofar as

8 JUN 1 1973

Enclosures
HAB:ifc/hc
(6)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 3

8 JUN 14 1973

PERS. REC. UNIT

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum to [redacted]
Re: STATE DEPARTMENT INQUIRY CONCERNING
FBI POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS

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b7C

Section Chief Boynton was aware, our policy has always been one of very tight, top-level control ranging from consideration on an individual case basis to complete nonuse. He was informed that, when such examinations are used, a decision is made at the highest level based upon the facts surrounding the circumstances of each incident wherein the use of a polygraph examination is considered. Gentile stated that the State Department press release would contain no information referring to FBI polygraph examination policy.

ACTION:

For information.



Memorandum to [redacted] b6 b7C
Re: STATE DEPARTMENT INQUIRY CONCERNING
FBI POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 5/24/73 (HAB:hc)

The July 23, 1971, edition of "The New York Times" carried an article containing highly classified information pertaining to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) under the byline of William Beecher. Because the information contained in the article could well compromise the U. S. position in those talks, the White House became gravely concerned over the fact that the information contained in the "New York Times" article had been leaked to the press. Several suspects were placed under investigation by the White House and the Bureau was requested to assist in polygraph examination of one of the suspects - Dr. William R. Van Cleave, who at that time was Special Assistant to the Secretary for Plans and Policy of the Department of Defense. Upon the instructions of the Director, Associate Director [redacted] and Inspector [redacted] attended a meeting at the White House on Saturday, 7/24/71, concerning the use of FBI personnel in affording polygraph examinations to Van Cleave and other logical suspects (see enclosure-[redacted] memo 7/26/71). The polygraph examination of Van Cleave was scheduled for 2 p.m. on 7/26/71. The polygraph was not conducted on 7/26/71 but was postponed until the following day, 7/27/71. On this latter date, Mr. Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, advised that a decision had been made that [redacted] would conduct all polygraph examinations concerning the SALT leaks (see enclosure - [redacted] memo 7/27/71). b3 b6 b7C b7E

The Bureau's long-standing policy in regard to the use of the polygraph has been the implementation of its use on a highly selective basis on a case-by-case basis. This policy was set forth in instructions to the field on January 28, 1972, at which time instructions were issued that consideration would be given to the use of the polygraph technique on a selective basis in certain criminal cases where in unusual circumstances it was indicated that a polygraph examination would be helpful. According to these instructions, Bureau authority is required in each instance prior to the discussion of a polygraph examination with, and the obtaining of the written consent of, the person on whom it is to be used.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Felt
Sullivan
Mohr
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Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Gale
Ponder
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : [redacted]

FROM : [redacted]

DATE: 7-26-71

~~FOR INFORMATION~~
~~DO NOT FILE~~

SUBJECT: SALT TALK LEAK

Pursuant to your instructions, Inspector [redacted] of [redacted] and I attended a special meeting at the White House at 2:30 p.m., Saturday, 7-24-71.

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistan to the President for Domestic Affairs. Also in attendance were David O. Cook Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration; Leonard Niederlehner Deputy General Counsel, Department of Defense; Brigadier General Alexander Haig, Jr., Assistant to Dr. Kissinger; Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security; and [redacted] to Mr. Krogh.

b6
b7C

Krogh called attention to the story in the New York Times on Friday, 7-23-71, written by William Beecher, a New York reporter. The news article discloses highly confidential information regarding proposals being made by U.S. negotiators at Helsinki that would halt construction of both land based missiles and missile submarines. Krogh said that the President "was up on the ceiling" about this leak and wanted effective steps taken to determine the source within 36 hours.

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WMF:crt
(2)

ENCLOSURE [redacted]

(OVER....)

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COPY MADE FOR [redacted]

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b7C

Memorandum to [redacted] b6 b7C
Re: Salt Talk Leak

It was agreed that the contents of Van Cleave's safe should be impounded and inventoried immediately and this order was issued by telephone from the conference. It was also agreed that Van Cleave should be immediately interviewed. The interview was to have been conducted by the Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force (OSI) and by [redacted] b6 b7C I rejected a proposal that the FBI sit in on this interview pointing out that at this stage the matter was an internal administrative one and that the FBI should not enter the picture until a criminal violation was indicated.

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By separate memorandum I am submitting background data concerning [redacted] and the results of file reviews concerning Van Cleave. b6 b7C

ADDENDUM:

Since dictating the above, Donald Stewart, Chief of the Investigative Division, Department of Defense, called to advise that interview of Van Cleave had not been conclusive and the Secretary of Defense has requested that a polygraph examination be conducted by the FBI. Van Cleave has agreed to this examination which will be conducted at 2:00 p. m. today in the Laboratory. Our polygraph operators are being briefed now by Stewart.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Felt b6
Sullivan b7C
Mohr
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Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Gale b6
Ponder b7C
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : [redacted]

FROM : [redacted]

DATE: 7-27-71

SUBJECT: SALT TALK LEAK

FOR INFORMATION
DO NOT FILE

Mr. Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affiars, just called concerning the scheduled polygraph examination for suspect William R. Van Cleave which was to have been conducted at 2:00 p.m. today.

Krogh stated that a decision had been made to have [redacted] b3 b7E conduct all polygraph examinations in this matter. Krogh advised if we had no objection he would instruct the Defense Department to arrange with [redacted] for Van Cleave's examination today.

I told Krogh that the Bureau had no objection and that the Director's position in this matter was simply to render whatever possible service we could to the White House. I told him that we were standing by and would await his further advice in the matter. I also told him we should be advised immediately if any indication of a Federal violation developed.

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ACTION:

I have advised [redacted] in the Laboratory of this development and have instructed him that two polygraph operators who were called in from New York can be released to return to New York later this afternoon. We will have three qualified examiners should there be any further developments; however, it is beginning to appear that no further action in this matter by the Bureau will be necessary.

WMF:crt
(2)

Returned to WFC with borrowed polygraphs 7/27/71

JUN 9 1975

[redacted] b3 b7E

ENCLOSURE

AX [redacted] b3 b7E

On 12/28/71, [redacted] Civilian, U.S. Air Force Postal and Courier Service, 5250 Port Royal Road, (next door to AAA Decorating Company) advised he knows [redacted] only casually and that [redacted] He stated that the various firms in that portion of the shopping center rent from Barry Associates, Inc., 6838 Franconia Road, Springfield, Virginia. b6 b7C

On 12/28/71, [redacted] of Barry Associates, advised that [redacted] does rent 5250-B Port Royal Road for use by the AAA Decorating Company. He continued that he does not know [redacted] particularly well but does know [redacted] describing [redacted] stated that in view of his acquaintance with [redacted] information of an identifying nature. b6 b7C

U.S.A.

Various local city directories list [redacted] as having been associated in the past with the [redacted] b6 b7C

Contact on 1/10/72, with the [redacted] without identifying the caller revealed that [redacted] was remembered at that office but that they had no information concerning him other than he might be reached through [redacted] b6 b7C

The paucity of background information concerning [redacted] is no doubt due to the fact that he has worked for and lived [redacted] (Baltimore airtel dated 12/20/71, captioned as above). b6 b7C

AX [redacted]

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A check of the records of the following Police agencies in Northern Virginia, by IC [redacted] on the dates indicated met with negative results:

Arlington County, Virginia Police Department	1/11/72
Fairfax County, Virginia Police Department	1/12/72
Alexandria, Virginia Police Department	1/11/72
Falls Church, Virginia Police Department	1/12/72

This case is being placed in a RUC status.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -

The Attorney General

January 19, 1972

Director, FBI

1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
1 - [redacted]

INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Enclosed is a memorandum covering this Bureau's investigation during the past week relating to Daniel Ellsberg and the publication of material concerning the United States-Vietnam relations during the period 1945-1967.

The memorandum also covers this Bureau's investigation during the past week relating to the unauthorized disclosure involving the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

We are continuing these investigations, and you will be furnished further results obtained.

Single copies of the enclosure are also being sent to the Honorable H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President, and the Honorable Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, at The White House.

Enclosure

62-93188

[redacted]

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)

1 - Assistant Attorney General (Enclosure)
Internal Security Division

1 - [redacted] (MC LEK)
1 - (SALT LEK)

b3
b7E

JRW:tjp
(14)

DUPLICATE YELLOW

60 JAN 21 1972

NR 12

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
1 -

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b7C

January 18, 1972

1 - [redacted]

INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

1 - [redacted]
1 -

Daniel Ellsberg:

According to news media reports in the Los Angeles, California, area, Anthony J. Russo, Jr., [redacted] Daniel Ellsberg was reportedly the [redacted]

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Prior information had been developed indicating Russo [redacted] Daniel Ellsberg had indicated neither he nor [redacted]

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b7C

Anthony J. Russo, Jr., has been publicly identified as a close friend, confidant and associate of Daniel Ellsberg's. On December 29, 1971, a Federal Grand Jury in Los Angeles, California, returned a true bill charging Ellsberg and Russo with violations of the Theft of Government Property and Espionage Statutes, as well as conspiracy to violate these Statutes.

Investigation has determined that [redacted]

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On January 10, 1972, [redacted] advised that the latter [redacted] said he had been in San Francisco but returned to Los Angeles to attend a memorial service for Richard E. Youmans, following which he planned to leave for San Francisco on the night of January 9, 1972.

62-98194
1 - [redacted] (MC LEK)
(1) (SALT LEK)
JRW:bjp (15)

[redacted]

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

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Richard E. Youmans, [redacted] drowned on January 2, 1972, while scuba diving at Malibu Beach, California. Prior investigation revealed [redacted] Richard and [redacted] were contacted concerning their knowledge of Ellsberg and his activities, and both refused to furnish information. In October, 1971, [redacted] was scheduled to appear before a Federal Grand Jury in Los Angeles, which was then hearing information relative to Daniel Ellsberg. [redacted] attorney advised the United States Attorney on this occasion that she would refuse to testify before this Jury. b3 b6 b7C

[redacted] further advised that during his visit with [redacted] Daniel Ellsberg suggested [redacted] He informed her that he and [redacted] He indicated, however, [redacted] would have to do this prior to June, 1972, inasmuch as his contract with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology expires at that time. [redacted] suggested to [redacted] b6 b7C

It is noted [redacted] b6 b7C

On January 14, 1972, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that a dinner is scheduled on January 20, 1972, at the Biltmore Hotel, New York City, honoring Mrs. Ruth Gage Colby for her "25 Years' Work for Peace." Mrs. Colby

1/19/72

is a representative of the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC). According to the source, scheduled speakers at this dinner include Daniel Ellsberg, Congresswoman Bella S. Abzug of New York, John Kerry of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and columnist Tom Wicker of "The New York Times."

NPAC was founded in 1970 by members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). Its basic objective is to unite masses of people, including labor unions, soldiers and the black community, in a struggle to end United States intervention in Southeast Asia through orderly and peaceful tactics. The SWP has been designated as coming within the purview of Executive Order 10450.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Leak:

This investigation involves the unauthorized disclosure of classified information which appeared in a July 23, 1971, article by William Beecher in "The New York Times."

On January 12, 1972 Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation contacted William Beecher, a correspondent of "The New York Times," for the purpose of arranging an interview concerning his July 23, 1971, article. Beecher stated he would have to speak with [redacted], Washington bureau chief of "The New York Times," prior to responding to the request for interview. Beecher subsequently contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation and respectfully declined to be interviewed. He explained it was his feeling, as well as that of [redacted] that since the interview would necessarily concern his sources of news information, which Beecher was unwilling to discuss, it was felt no useful purpose would be served by meeting with FBI representatives. b6 b7C

NOTE:

Xerox copies furnished the Honorable H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President, and the Honorable Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, at The White House, and to the Attorney General with copies to his Deputy and the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, by cover letter.

Confidential source referred to is [redacted] b6 b7C b7D b7E

1/19/72